The decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that arbitrators lacked authority to decide a dispute between the parties arising under an investment treaty between the United Kingdom and Argentina, which contained a local litigation requirement, is reversed and remanded, where: 1) a court of the United States, in reviewing an arbitration award made under the treaty should interpret and apply “threshold” provisions concerning arbitration using the framework developed for interpreting similar provisions in ordinary contracts; 2) under that framework, the local litigation requirement is a matter for arbitrators primarily to interpret and apply; 3) courts should review their interpretation with deference; and 4) while Argentina is entitled to court review (under a properly deferential standard) of the arbitrators’ decision to excuse plaintiff’s noncompliance with the litigation requirement, that review shows that the arbitrators’ determinations were lawful.
Defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. section 924(c), using or carrying a gun in connection with a drug trafficking crime, is vacated and remanded, where: 1) the Government establishes that a defendant aided and abetted a section 924(c) violation by proving that the defendant actively participated in the underlying drug trafficking or violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission; and 2) the trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous because they failed to require that defendant knew in advance that one of his cohorts would be armed.
The whistleblower protection provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 contained in 18 U. S. C. section 1514A include employees of a public company’s private contractors and subcontractors when they report covered forms of fraud.
The Bankruptcy Court exceeded the limits of its authority when it ordered that the $75,000 protected by the debtor’s homestead exemption be made available to pay the bankruptcy trustee’s attorney’s fees, which were incurred by the trustee in overcoming the debtor’s fraudulent misrepresentations.
Under 18 U. S. C. section 1382, which makes it a crime to reenter a “military installation” after having been ordered not to do so by any officer or person in command, the term “military installation” encompasses the commanding officer’s area of responsibility, and includes Vandenberg Air Force Base’s highways and protest area. The Ninth Circuit’s holding otherwise is therefore vacated and remanded.
The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 does not preclude the plaintiffs’ state-law class actions, which allege that defendants helped Allen Stanford and his companies perpetrate a Ponzi scheme by falsely representing that uncovered securities (certificates of deposit in Stanford International Bank) that plaintiffs were purchasing were backed by covered securities.
The rule of Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103 (2006), that the consent of one occupant to a search is insufficient when another occupant is present and objects to the search, does not extend to the very different situation in this case, where consent was provided by an abused woman well after her partner, the defendant, had been removed from the apartment they shared.
When challenging the legality of a 21 U.S.C. section 853(e)(1) pre-trial asset seizure, a criminal defendant who has been indicted is not constitutionally entitled to contest a grand jury’s determination of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crimes charged.
In a tort action filed in Nevada arising out of allegations against a Georgia police officer who searched plaintiffs at a Georgia airport, seized a large amount of cash, and allegedly drafted a false probable cause affidavit in support of the funds’ forfeiture, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the district could exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant lacks the “minimal contacts” with Nevada that are a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him.
The Alabama appellate court’s ruling denying the petition for habeas relief, which challenged petitioner’s murder conviction, is vacated and remanded, where: 1) the Alabama courts incorrectly applied Strickland v. Washington to petitioner’s case; 2) petitioner’s trial attorney rendered constitutionally deficient performance because it was unreasonable for petitioner’s lawyer to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that available funding was capped at $1,000; and 3) the matter must be remanded for inquiry into whether, under the proper standard, petitioner’s attorney’s deficient performance was prejudicial under Strickland.